미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친effect(영향)
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작성일 22-10-17 00:22
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Download : 미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향.pdf
따라서 부시 government 는 확고하고 지속적인 강경책이 북한을 alteration(변화) 시키는데 보다 효과(效果)적이라고 판단하였다. 부시 government 는 그동안 개최되었던 3자 회담과 1차?2차 6자 회담을 통해 북한에게 주도권을 양보할 의사가 없다는 것을 명백히 하고, 북한이 핵문제를 통해 경제적인 지원을 얻고자 하는 태도를 바꾸지 않는다면 군사제재도 고려할 수 있다는 입장을 확고히 하였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 제네바협정을 어겼…(skip)
설명
미국외교정책,관료정치,동맹,1차,북핵위기,2차,북핵위기,논문,졸업,경영학,경영경제,레포트
[졸업] 미국의 대북한 인식관료정치그리고 동맹이 북핵위기에 미친영향: 1993년 1차 북핵위기와 2002년 2차 북핵위기를 중심으로에 대한 자료입니다 , 미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향경영경제레포트 , 미국외교정책 관료정치 동맹 1차 북핵위기 2차 북핵위기 논문 졸업 경영학
다.
미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친effect(영향)
순서
레포트/경영경제
[졸업] 미국의 대북한 인식관료정치그리고 동맹이 북핵위기에 미친effect(영향) : 1993년 1차 북핵위기와 2002년 2차 북핵위기를 중심으로에 대한 資料입니다
Download : 미국의+대북한+인식.관료정치.그리고+동맹이+북핵위기에+미친영향.pdf( 74 )
차 례
그림order (차례) ··································································································································· 3
표 차 례 ··································································································································· 3
국 문 요 약 ····························································································································· 4
제1장 서 론 ··························································································································· 1
1.1 문제제기 ························································································································ 1
1.2 연구방법 ························································································································ 4
제2장 이론(理論)적 논의와 分析 틀 ····························································································· 7
2.1 미국외교정책결定義(정의) 일반적 구조 ············································································ 7
2.1.1 인식과 외교정책 ··································································································· 7
2.1.2 국내정치와 외교정책 ························································································· 10
2.1.3 국외정치와 외교정책 ························································································· 13
2.2 국제관계에서 북핵의 의미 ······················································································ 16
2.3 이론(理論)적 배경과 分析 틀 ···························································································· 26
제3장 1차 북핵위기와 클린턴 government 의 외교정책 ··························································· 37
3.1 개 관 ·························································································································· 37
3.2 클린턴 government 의 1차 북핵위기에 대한 외교정책결정요인 ·································· 43
3.2.1 클린턴 government 의 북한에 대한 인식 ··································································· 43
3.2.2 클린턴 government 의 관료정치 ··················································································· 47
3.2.3 1차 북핵위기와 한국?Japan?china?러시아 ················································· 53
3.3 1차 북핵위기와 클린턴 government 의 외교정책의 일관성 ·········································· 59
3.3.1 북한과의 강한 협상의지 ··················································································· 59
3.3.2 협상의 타결 ········································································································· 64
3.3.3 일관성 있는 외교정책 ······················································································· 70
3.4 평 가 ·························································································································· 80
제4장 2차 북핵위기와 부시 government 의 외교정책 ······························································· 84
4.1 개 관 ·························································································································· 84
4.2 부시government 의 2차 북핵위기에 대한 외교정책결정요인 ········································ 93
4.2.1 부시government 의 북한에 대한 인식 ········································································· 93
4.2.2 부시government 의 관료정치 ························································································· 95
4.2.3 2차 북핵위기와 한국?Japan?china?러시아 ··············································· 103
4.3 2차 북핵위기와 부시 government 의 외교정책의 비일관성 ········································ 110
4.3.1. 북한과의 약한 협상의지 ················································································· 110
4.3.2. 협상의 지연 ······································································································· 115
4.3.3. 일관성 없는 외교정책 ····················································································· 119
4.4 평 가 ························································································································ 130
제5장 결 론 ······················································································································· 134
출처 ······························································································································· 139
부 록 ······························································································································· 155
ABSTRACT ························································································································ 174
클린턴 government 의 유화적인 대응방식으로 인해 북한에게 핵문제에 대한 주도권을 뺏기고, 핵개발의 빌미를 제공했다고 보았다.
1차 북핵위기시 북한의 보상외교와는 달리 부시 government 는 2차 북핵위기를 통해 미국이 대화의 주도권을 잡고 북한에게 역보상외교를 요구하고 있따 하지만 부시 government 의 북한에 대한 무리한 요구는 오히려 회담의 협상력을 떨어뜨리는 결과를 초래하고 있따 부시 government 가 2차 북핵위기에서 대북한 외교의 goal(목표) 는 1차 북핵위기처럼 현상유지가 아니라 이번 위기를 계기로 핵개발이 근절되기를 바라고 있는것이다.
